Second, in addition to sweeping the organizational guidelines under its statutory remedy, Booker's constitutional reasoning applies to the organizational guidelines. This conclusion is not immediately obvious. After Booker, sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional if they direct a judge to find facts that increase the maximum guideline sentence that can be imposed on the defendant, thereby robbing him of his right to have those facts found by a jury. 8 Thus, if a defendant does not have the right to a jury trial, a judge can presumably sentence him based on mandatory guidelines without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Because of this wrinkle, one might expect that organizations can still be sentenced under mandatory guidelines-after all, it is not self-evident that organizations have jury rights.
Nevertheless, based on decisions from lower federal courts, organizations sentenced under the organizational guidelines-with the possible exception of large organizations facing relatively modest fines-are entitled to a jury trial. 9 Because Booker's Sixth Amendment reasoning therefore will apply to the organizational guidelines in most cases, Congress cannot restore the guidelines to mandatory status by a quick statutory fix. Moreover, even if Congress could constitutionally reinstate the guidelines' mandatory status for those organizations that are not entitled to a jury trial, it would be unwise to do so as a policy matter: mandatory guidelines are unable to account for the wide variety of circumstances surrounding organizational crime and have proven unnecessary to fulfill the goals for which the guidelines were created. 10 This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces Booker and explains that Booker rendered the organizational guidelines nonmandatory. Part II discusses the organizational guidelines, including their origin and their operation. Part III considers the various approaches that courts have taken to determine the jury rights of organizations and finds that under current law, organizations are entitled to criminal jury trials in some but not all instances. Part IV concludes that after Booker the organizational guidelines neither can nor should be mandatory.
7.
543 U.S. at 244-45, 249.
8.
Id. at 244.
9.
See infra text accompanying notes 193-201. 10. See infra Section IV.B.
Sixth Amendment rights. 19 After Apprendi and Blakely, the prosecution bore the burden of proving to a jury any fact (other than a prior conviction) that would increase the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 20 Because the sentencing guidelines generally instructed judges to find facts themselves and to use those facts to impose higher sentences than could be imposed based on jury-found facts alone, 21 the Booker Court declared unconstitutional the combination of judicial fact-finding and mandatory sentencing guidelines. 22 To remedy the guidelines' constitutional woes, the Court excised two statutory provisions: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 23 The latter provision set forth standards for review of sentences on appeal;
24 the former required judges to follow the guidelines' sentencing recommendation absent a special justification for departure. 25 Thus, the excision of § 3553(b)(1) means that judges are no longer bound to implement the guidelines. 26 Because Booker involved the sentencing of an individual defendant, the question remains whether the Court's remedy extends to the organizational guidelines. The answer is plainly yes. Although the organizational guidelines were created separately and operate differently than the individual guidelines, 27 § 3553(b)(1) does not distinguish between the two. It refers only to "the sentencing guidelines."
28 Thus, when Booker declared § 3553(b)(1) invalid, all of the sentencing guidelines became nonmandatory. Furthermore, Justice Breyer emphasized that this result was not merely an accident of the statute, but also reflected the Court's refusal to leave in place a dual system of guidelines:
[W]e do not see how it is possible to leave the Guidelines as binding in other cases. . . . [W] e believe that Congress would not have authorized a mandatory system in some cases and a nonmandatory system in others, given the administrative complexities that such a system would 19. 543 U. S. 220, 226-27 (2005) .
20.
Id. at 244. In addition, the Court acknowledged that an increase in sentence would be appropriate when the defendant had admitted to the facts supporting such an increase. Id.
21.
See infra text accompanying notes 80-82. create. Such a two-system proposal seems unlikely to further Congress' basic objective of promoting uniformity in sentencing.
29
This language eliminates any remaining uncertainty about Booker's applicability to the organizational guidelines.
Since Booker, courts seem simply to have taken this result for granted, treating organizational sentencing no differently than individual sentencing. 30 To date, only one federal court has expressly considered how Booker affected the organizational guidelines. In United States v. Yang, the Sixth Circuit first considered whether the corporation had a right to a jury trial, and it concluded that the $2 million fine at issue indicated that the charged crime was sufficiently "serious" to entitle the corporation to a jury trial. 31 The court then applied Booker to hold that the corporation had been denied a constitutional right when it was sentenced based on judge-found facts in combination with mandatory organizational guidelines.
32
Of course, the statutory remedy in Booker made Yang's analysis unnecessary; the guidelines were not mandatory regardless of whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial. Nonetheless, the Yang analysis remains relevant to the larger assessment of post-Booker organizational sentencing. Although § 3553(b)(1) is excised for the time being, Congress could attempt to resurrect some version of it in the future, 33 in which case courts would be obliged to assess whether mandatory organizational guidelines violate defendant organizations' constitutional right to a jury trial. This Note aims to make that determination and to illustrate why the organizational guidelines should remain nonmandatory. 
ii. the organizational sentencing guidelines
Criminal prosecution and sentencing of organizations have changed greatly in the last century. One hundred years ago, it was unclear whether an organization could even be convicted of a crime. Until roughly twenty years ago, organizations were sentenced under the same standards as individuals. Then, fifteen years ago, the organizational guidelines became the benchmark for sentencing organizations. This Part traces these developments and describes how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have changed organizational sentencing.
A. Convicting Organizations of Crimes
Today, corporations and other organizations can be convicted of crimes based on their agents' conduct, but they have not always been so liable. Under the English common law, corporations could not be convicted of crimes, 34 and the same held true during the first hundred years of the United States' existence. 35 The primary rationale for exempting the corporation from criminal liability was its artificiality. As William Blackstone wrote, "[Its] existence being ideal, no man can apprehend or arrest it."
36 It was thought that a corporation had "no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked." 37 As corporations began to grow in importance during the late nineteenth century, however, the law increasingly regarded them as real rather than artificial entities, and the government took a greater interest in regulating them.
The theory that "the corporation may be held responsible for damages for the acts of its agent within the scope of his employment." 39 In the decades since, federal courts have refined New York Central's standard of corporate vicarious liability into its current form and expanded it to apply to all organizations. Today, an organization may be held liable for crimes that its agent commits within the scope of his authority (or apparent authority) and with the intent to benefit the organization. 40 The "benefit" threshold is quite low: an agent intends to "benefit" his organization as long as he is at least partially motivated by the interests of the organization, even if his conduct harms the organization or contravenes its policies or explicit instruction.
41 Accordingly, an organization is legally responsible for many of its agents' crimes, even if the government declines to press charges against it.
42

B. The Statutory Background of the Organizational Guidelines
The history of the organizational guidelines begins in 1984 with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act. 43 The Reform Act had two independent effects on organizational sentencing. First, it created the United States Sentencing Commission, 44 which promulgated guidelines to direct federal sentencing and produced the organizational guidelines seven years after its creation. 45 Second, it created a new statutory system of organizational fines, increasing all criminal fines for organizations and distinguishing between individual and organizational penalties to a degree uncommon in earlier law. This new regime of organizational fines sought to correct a system that was widely perceived as weak and unfair. Prior to the Reform Act, federal law usually applied the same fines-typically no more than a few thousand dollars-to all offenders, whether individuals, mom-and-pop firms, or major multinational corporations.
47 Accordingly, fines were low enough for large corporations to safely ignore them, giving them an incentive to commit crimes if doing so offered a chance of significant profit. 48 The Reform Act attempted to remove these incentives by significantly increasing the maximum fines that organizations faced. 49 For instance, prior to 1984, an organization faced a fine of no more than $1000 for each count of felony mail fraud. 50 After the passage of the Reform Act and related legislation, all felonies committed by organizations carried a potential fine of at least $500,000.
51 Mean fines more than doubled, 52 and eventually the total sanctions against firms-now averaging in the hundreds of thousands of dollars-became roughly equal to the monetary harm caused.
53
The Reform Act also created the statutory framework upon which the Sentencing Commission eventually built the organizational guidelines. Under this framework, an "organization" is defined as any "person other than an individual," 54 organization to a fine or to probation; it can sanction the organization with forfeiture, restitution, or an order to notify victims; or it can combine any of these punishments. 56 Fines imposed on an organization may be no more than the greatest of: (1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense; (2) twice the gross gain to the organization; (3) twice the gross loss to its victims; and (4) $500,000 for a felony (or misdemeanor resulting in death), $200,000 for a class A misdemeanor, or $10,000 for a class B or C misdemeanor or lesser offense. 57 Thus, unless specially exempted, 58 every felony committed by an organization can be punished by a fine of at least $500,000, and the fine may be far greater depending on the type of offense and the amount of loss or gain it caused.
59
Several statutory provisions taken together describe how courts must determine the appropriate sentence for an organization. The most important of these provisions is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which sets forth a variety of relevant factors, such as "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," 60 that judges must take into account during sentencing. Before Booker, because § 3553(b) required judges to impose a sentence within the guideline range unless they found an aggravating or mitigating factor "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission," 61 judges sentencing organizations (and individuals) generally ignored § 3553(a)'s factors. 62 Since Booker weakened the guidelines' predominance by making them advisory, § 3553(a) has once again become integral to sentencing. 
C. How Courts Use the Guidelines To Sentence Organizations
At the same time that Congress was fine-tuning its statutory framework for sentencing organizations, the Sentencing Commission, which had published individual sentencing guidelines in 1987, 64 turned its attention to creating organizational sentencing guidelines. During the drafting process, the business community argued that the guidelines should be nonbinding "policy statements," rather than mandatory rules, because of the complexity of organizational sentencing and the absence of a sound empirical basis for setting the fine levels. 65 The Commission disagreed, asserting that mandatory guidelines were necessary to fulfill Congress's mandate of bringing greater certainty and consistency to all areas of sentencing. 66 Moreover, Commission members argued, the organizational guidelines gave judges broader sentencing ranges than did the individual guidelines, allowing judges sufficient flexibility to account for unusual or complex aspects of organizational sentencing.
67 Some Commission members also believed that only mandatory guidelines would encourage organizations to take institutional steps to prevent employee crime.
68 Thus, the organizational guidelines were mandatory when promulgated in 1991, 69 and they remained mandatory and largely unchanged until Booker.
Under these guidelines, a judge determines an organization's sentence by beginning with a "base fine," which is then adjusted using a "culpability score."
70 To calculate the base fine, a judge first looks to the offense level of the crime, as established by chapter two of the sentencing guidelines. 71 The judge then refers to the "Offense Level Fine Table" in chapter eight, which gives a corresponding fine for each offense level: an offense level of six, for instance, corresponds to a maximum $5000 fine, while a level thirty offense corresponds to a maximum $10.5 million fine. 72 The judge then compares this amount with the organization's pecuniary gain from the offense and the loss caused by the offense. 73 The greatest of the three is the base fine.
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The culpability score is based, inter alia, on the organization's prior history, whether upper-level personnel tolerated or were involved in the crime, whether the organization cooperated with the government and accepted responsibility, and whether the organization had an "effective compliance and ethics program" designed to prevent employee wrongdoing.
75 An organization's culpability score in turn determines a minimum and maximum multiplier: the highest multiplier range (corresponding to the highest culpability score) is 2.00 to 4.00, and the lowest range is 0.05 to 0.20. 76 The judge multiplies the base fine by each of these multipliers, yielding a fine range. 77 The organizational guidelines, for example, would direct a judge to sentence an organization facing a base fine of $20,000 and with a culpability score of 5 (and a corresponding multiplier range of 1.00 to 2.00) to a fine between $20,000 and $40,000. The organizational guidelines also direct the judge to depart upward or downward from the recommended sentencing range in certain special circumstances, including when the organization would be unable to pay the fine imposed. 78 In addition to fines, the guidelines direct the judge to impose restitution, probation, disgorgement, and other remedies as required to compensate the organization's victims and to prevent a recurrence of the crime.
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Given the complexity of the organizational guidelines, judges generally require a great deal of information to apply them. Much of this information is 
78.
For example, a judge may depart downward if the defendant gave substantial assistance to the authorities, or she may depart upward if the defendant's crime risked death or posed a threat to national security, the environment, or the integrity of a market. See id. § § 8C4.1-.5. A judge may also reduce a fine that would impair the organization's ability to make restitution to its victims or that would "substantially jeopardiz[e] the continued viability of the organization." Id. § 8C3.3. In addition, she may reduce the fine if an individual who "owns at least a 5 percent interest in the organization . . . has been fined in a federal criminal proceeding for the same offense conduct" (to avoid punishing the owner of a closely held firm twice for the same offense). Id. § 8C3.4.
79.
Id. § § 8B1.1-.3, 8C2.9, 8D1.1.
provided by the presentence report. 80 If the judge requires more information to impose a sentence, she can order further study of the defendant by a qualified consultant.
81 Judges can also gain the necessary information through the sentencing hearing.
82 Thus, the organizational guidelines, like the individual guidelines, rely heavily on judge-found facts in their operation.
D. Organizational Sentencing Statistics
The Commission publishes annual statistics of organizational sentences. Although these statistics are imperfect, 83 they provide a useful overview of how the guidelines have functioned.
From 1993 Approximately 56.7% paid only a fine, 16.6% paid only restitution, 17.6% paid both, and 9% paid neither. 90 The mean fine imposed was roughly $4.86 million, and the median was over $80,000 91 -a huge increase over preguidelines fines, which averaged roughly $100,000.
92 Additionally, more than 60% of organizations were subject to some form of probation.
93
Over 90% of sentenced organizations are commercial businesses, 94 the majority of which are small, closely held corporations. 95 In 2001, for instance, roughly 27.5% of organizations sentenced had 10 or fewer employees, 66.4% had 50 or fewer, 77.2% had 100 or fewer, and only 7.4% had 1000 or more.
96
Given that the vast majority of U.S. businesses have fewer than 1000 employees, this fact is unsurprising.
97 Small organizations may also be less able to conceal crimes or to avoid or defend against criminal charges.
98 Moreover, in small organizations criminal wrongdoing is less likely to go completely unobserved by upper-level personnel than in large corporations.
The guidelines' fine levels are not used in a significant number of cases. To begin with, the guidelines apply only to felonies and class A misdemeanors, 99 and the Commission has provided specific exemptions for certain types of 105 and the guidelines' basic fine system does apply to fraud cases.
106
In short, although every year the organizational guidelines are used to impose substantial fines on large corporations, such cases are exceptional. Instead, the typical defendant sentenced under the organizational guidelines is a small business that defrauded its customers or investors and now stands near the brink of bankruptcy.
iii. an organization's right to a criminal jury trial
When the Sentencing Commission created the organizational guidelines, it did not consider the constitutional rights of organizations. 107 In the wake of Booker, however, the Sixth Amendment rights of organizations may determine the future of the guidelines. Because Booker's holding was tied directly to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right, Congress' ability to resurrect the guidelines to mandatory status depends upon whether organizations have any Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
A. Do Organizations Possess Constitutional Rights?
When the Constitution was ratified, corporations and other organizations essentially had no constitutional rights. Over time, however, courts came to treat corporations more like individuals, not only making them subject to criminal liability, 108 but also extending to them some constitutional protections. Today, organizations enjoy many (but not all) of the same rights as individuals.
The common law was not sympathetic to corporate rights, and rights for other organizations were practically nonexistent. The corporation was merely a label that allowed a group of persons, contractually bound to one another and to the state via their charter, to organize more easily and to pass property and privileges more readily from generation to generation.
109 As a legal "person," the corporation possessed only the rights to own property, to sue and be sued, and to enter into contracts. 110 Otherwise, its legal capacity was limited. 111 This restricted view of corporate rights continued to dominate American law throughout most of the nineteenth century.
112 Not until the United States was industrializing and the corporation was growing in importance did courts begin to take corporate constitutional rights seriously.
Hale v. Henkel 113 was a milestone in the development of corporate rights. In Hale, the Court addressed whether a corporation possessed a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures or a Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Interestingly, the Court treated these two inquiries very differently. It recognized a corporate right against unreasonable searches and seizures by a "pass-through" analysis, whereby the corporation assumed the rights of the individuals composing it.
114
With regard to the corporation's claimed right against self-incrimination, however, the Court held that "a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may [not] such privileges." 115 Thus, whereas numerous constitutional rights flowed from a corporation's owners to the corporation itself, the unique nature of the corporation-its ability to pool assets, act collectively, and perhaps conceal information-prevented the right against self-incrimination from so flowing.
In the century since Hale, the Court has continued to develop its jurisprudence of corporate constitutional rights and has expanded this jurisprudence to reach other types of organizations.
116 Rather than trace this entire history in detail, a brief outline of the major organizational rights as they stand today will suffice. 117 Although the Court has never fully synthesized its organizational rights jurisprudence, the following generalizations may be drawn. Organizations usually have the same constitutional rights as individuals. They may have a particular right because it is necessary to protect the rights of the individuals in the organization (the "pass-through" rationale) 128 or because giving the organization such a right protects something else of independent social or constitutional value (for example, the free flow of information safeguarded by the First Amendment).
129 There are, however, several exceptions. 130 First, organizations do not receive the protections of rights that are "purely personal," that is, rights "the 'historic function' of [which] has been limited to the protection of individuals."
131 This is a potential rationale behind limiting an organization's privacy rights. Second, organizations do not receive the protection of a right when granting such protection would significantly undermine the government's ability to enforce the law. This may be one reason that organizations lack a right against self-incrimination. 130. The Court has left itself room to create more exceptions as needed. See id. at 778 n.14 (noting that a particular guarantee may be "unavailable to corporations for some other reason").
131.
Id. Whether the right is available to a corporation is determined by looking to the "nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision." Id. Although this framework may encapsulate many of the Court's decisions, it can be difficult to apply. Thus, even a century after the Court's decision in Hale, the bounds of many organizational rights, including organizational jury rights, remain vague.
B. Does the Sixth Amendment Entitle Organizations to a Criminal Jury Trial?
As recently as 1994, the law was unclear as to whether organizations were ever entitled to a criminal jury trial. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits both had held, without explanation, that organizations were entitled to jury trials, 134 but the Supreme Court had never decided the question. 135 Then, in International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, the Supreme Court held that the defendant, a labor union, had the right to a criminal jury trial. 136 The Court, however, declined to create any test for precisely when organizations would be entitled to a jury. 137 This Section explores the Court's jurisprudence on jury rights and the lower courts' attempts to adapt it to organizations.
All Defendants Are Entitled to a Jury When Charged with a Serious Crime
Despite the Constitution's apparent guarantee of a jury right in every criminal case, 138 courts have long restricted the right to a jury trial to those power of the federal and state governments to enforce their laws . . . ."); see also Henning, supra note 35, at 797 ("A corporate right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination could completely frustrate the criminal prosecution of corporate wrongdoing . . . ."). defendants accused of "serious" crimes. 139 The original ground for this distinction was the common law, which had allowed certain crimes to be tried by justices of the peace, 140 but this common law standard fell into disfavor by the early twentieth century. Instead, the Supreme Court began looking to "the severity of the [statutory maximum] penalty" for a crime to determine whether the crime was "serious."
141 The Court, however, failed to set any standard to guide this inquiry until 1966. In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 142 the Court adopted the definition of "petty" crime then used in 18 U.S.C. § 1-"[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both" 143 -to hold that a defendant given a six-month sentence for criminal contempt was not entitled to a jury because the charged crime was not serious. 144 Two years later, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 145 the Court abandoned its reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 1's definition of "petty." Although it did not settle "the exact location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes," it held that a crime punishable by two years in prison was sufficiently serious to merit a jury trial. 146 In Baldwin v. New York, 147 the Court did draw the line, ruling that the "near-uniform judgment of the Nation" was that a defendant was entitled to a criminal jury trial when his potential sentence exceeded six months in prison. 148 
When a Charge Against an Organization Is Serious
This lack of clarity in establishing an individual's right to a jury trial complicates the task of discerning when organizations are entitled to a jury. Organizations, of course, are never subject to imprisonment-only fines, restitution, forfeiture, notice to victims, and probation. 151 Thus, courts cannot rely on the six-month rule to determine whether an organization has a right to a jury trial. Instead, courts must identify other criteria to determine whether the maximum statutory fine the organization faces is "serious."
Because the six-month rule was originally based on 18 U.S.C. § 1's definition of a petty offense, using § 1 might seem to be a good way to decide when offenses committed by organizations are petty. 152 The Court, however, rejected this option in Muniz v. Hoffman.
153 Muniz involved a 13,000-member labor union charged with criminal contempt and facing a $10,000 fine.
154 At the time, § 1 set the maximum fine for a petty offense at $500, 155 and the Court concluded that "it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a $501 fine would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union." 156 months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less are petty crimes."). 152. An alternative to using the statutory definition of a petty crime would be to look to state practice. After all, the Court ultimately justified its six-month line for individual imprisonment on that basis, 454, 476-77 (1975) .
154.
Id. at 477. Courts usually look to the statutory maximum penalty to determine whether a crime is "serious." Because Muniz involved contempt charges, however, the Court instead used $10,000, the fine actually imposed. See supra note 144.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § § 19, 3571 (2000)).
156. Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477.
Indeed, given the union's immense size and resources, even the $10,000 fine was not so serious as to require a jury trial.
157
In addition to abandoning reliance on § 1, Muniz also suggested a subtle shift in the Court's approach to seriousness, at least for organizations. Prior to Muniz, a "serious" crime was one that society (as reflected by Congress) viewed as serious: a statutory maximum sentence of over six months simply indicated that society found the crime serious. 158 In Muniz, the Court viewed seriousness from the defendant's perspective rather than that of Congress or society: a crime was serious if the defendant could reasonably view the potential sentence as a serious deprivation. 159 Under the former approach, the identity and resources of a particular defendant are irrelevant. Under the latter approach, they may be decisive.
Ironically, the Court provided no guidance regarding the meaning of seriousness in International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 160 the only case in which it has explicitly recognized an organization's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Like Muniz, Bagwell involved contempt sanctions against a labor union. 161 The fines at issue in Bagwell, however, were considerably higher than the $10,000 at issue in Muniz: a penalty of over $64 million was initially levied and was later reduced to $52 million. 162 The Court recognized that this amount was serious, but it failed to give any guidance on how this determination should be made in future borderline cases: "We need not answer today the difficult question where the line between petty and serious contempt fines should be drawn, since a $52 million fine unquestionably is a serious contempt sanction."
163 Thus, Bagwell established that organizations have a right to a jury trial in at least some circumstances but gave no indication of how far this right extends.
157.
Id. After Muniz, Congress amended the definition of a "petty" crime to include all crimes with a potential fine of no more than $5000 for an individual or $10,000 for an organization. Despite this uncertainty, the decision in Bagwell coincides with the Court's overall organizational rights jurisprudence. As discussed above, the Court has granted rights to organizations for two reasons: (1) to protect something of independent social or constitutional value, and (2) to protect the rights of individuals within organizations. 164 Granting organizations a right to a jury provides something of independent constitutional value: a general safeguard against government oppression.
165 In addition, granting jury rights to organizations may also be necessary to protect the rights of individuals, as criminal charges against an organization inevitably affect the individuals who own or participate in the organization.
C. Possible Solutions to the Dilemma of Organizational Jury Rights
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts faced with determining when an organization is entitled to a jury trial have employed two tests: the case-by-case approach, which considers seriousness from the organization's perspective, and the bright-line approach, which considers seriousness from an objective standpoint. Although courts seem to favor the case-by-case approach, the bright-line approach may be superior: it is easier to apply and closely resembles the Court's six-month rule for deciding when individuals are entitled to a jury.
The Case-by-Case Approach
The leading example of the case-by-case approach is United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 166 which held that the seriousness of the crime should be based in part on the defendant organization's assets. The Fourth Circuit invoked the Supreme Court's decision in Muniz that a $10,000 fine, although "serious" under the statute, was insufficient to trigger a right to a jury trial given that the defendant was a large union. The court read Muniz to require "that the right to a jury trial be gauged, somehow, according to the ratio of the fine imposed and the defendant's ability to pay." 167 Thus, it suggested that an organization has a right to a jury when the fine becomes "of such magnitude as to constitute a 164. See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
165. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) ("A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.").
166. 681 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1982) . Although Troxler Hosiery concerned sentencing for contempt, the court's language suggests that the decision applies to organizational sentencing more broadly. Id.
167.
Id. at 936 n.2.
serious deprivation" for the defendant. 168 To decide whether the threatened fine of $80,000 would impose a serious deprivation, the court looked at the steps the defendant (with a net worth of $540,000) would have to take to acquire the necessary cash, and it concluded that the fine was not so serious as to require a jury trial.
169
Other courts have also adopted the case-by-case approach. Notably, in United States v. NYNEX Corp., the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a potential $1 million fine was not serious enough to implicate the Sixth Amendment because "[s]uch a fine is simply not serious to a corporation of NYNEX's magnitude. A $1,000,000 fine would, for example, constitute one-tenth of one percent of NYNEX's average annual net income of over $1 billion."
170 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Yang considered the threatened fine in light of the organization's assets, liabilities, ownership structure, and net annual profit to determine whether the organization was entitled to a jury. 171 The court emphasized that the defendant was a closely held corporation and that the threatened $2 million fine would be more than twenty times its annual net profit. The high fine thus rendered the crime serious enough to entitle the corporation to a jury.
172
The best argument for the case-by-case approach is the Supreme Court's decision in Muniz. Although Muniz does not explicitly endorse this approach, it implies that a judge must consider the nature and size of the defendant organization when determining whether the charged offense is serious.
173 This approach also has certain practical advantages. It better accounts for the great variety in organization size and type than would a predetermined petty/serious cut-off: for example, a $100,001 fine might be negligible for a large multinational but catastrophic for a mom-and-pop. 174 More prosaically, the case-by-case approach avoids the periodic need to adjust a fine threshold for inflation. 173. 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) (reasoning that the "circumstances" of the organization may be relevant to whether it is entitled to a jury).
174. See NYNEX, 781 F. Supp. at 28 n.12 (criticizing the Second Circuit's $100,000 petty/serious line).
See id.
Yet this approach also has its problems. Its flexibility clashes with the Court's six-month bright-line approach to individual jury rights. It could also mire courts in complicated efforts to determine an organization's size and assets. And, perhaps most importantly, it could foster disparity among lower courts about an important constitutional right, thereby inviting unproductive litigation.
The Bright-Line Approach
The primary example of a bright-line approach to organizational jury rights is United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., in which the Second Circuit held that an organization is entitled to a jury trial whenever it faces a penalty exceeding $100,000. 176 For fines of $100,000 or less, the court indicated that it would "remain appropriate to consider whether the fine has such a significant financial impact upon a particular organization as to indicate that the punishment is for a serious offense, requiring a jury trial."
177 This system, the court argued, keeps faith with the core principle . . . that the substantiality of the . . . penalty determines the availability of the right to a jury. . . . [A] large fine is a punishment of significance, and at some point the amount of a fine indicates that an offense is serious, no matter how substantial the financial reserves of the contemnor.
178
In other words, the Second Circuit reasoned that the seriousness of the organizational fine should be assessed objectively, not from the defendant's perspective.
When deciding upon the seriousness threshold, the court began with $500,000 179 -the lowest statutory maximum that an organization charged with a felony could face-and concluded that "some significant portion of this figure is the appropriate threshold for determining an organization's right to a jury trial." 180 It settled on $100,000. § 3571 (2000) , the statutory maximum fine for a felony committed by an organization is always $500,000 but may be higher.
180. Fox Film, 882 F.2d at 665.
Id.
The $100,000 threshold has an additional logic, though the court did not mention it in Fox Film. As discussed, an individual is entitled to a jury trial whenever he faces a possible sentence of more than six months. 182 Because the maximum prison sentence for any class of misdemeanor is one year, 183 the petty/serious cut-off for imprisonment is one-half of the maximum misdemeanor sentence. Notably, the baseline statutory maximum faced by an organization charged with a class A misdemeanor not resulting in death is $200,000.
184 Thus, Fox Film's $100,000 line, like the six-month line, is half of the typical maximum misdemeanor sentence. Fox Film's $100,000 bright-line approach, therefore, nicely parallels the court's six month bright-line rule, even if it does depart somewhat from Muniz's focus on the impact of the fine on a particular defendant. It also relieves courts of the administrative burden of determining how "serious" the fine would be to the particular organization, at least for the large percentage of cases in which the potential fine is above $100,000.
185
One potential disadvantage of the bright-line approach is that huge corporations facing what are only moderate fines compared to their net worth would always have a right to a jury trial, while smaller organizations would have to undergo the case-by-case analysis. This state of affairs, however, might not be as unjust as it may appear at first glance. A prominent corporation charged with criminal activity will often face damage to its reputation far more costly than any fine 186 : share prices drop, creditors become wary, and customers lose goodwill. Thus, a criminal charge may be "serious" even when the threatened fine would not be a blip in the corporation's balance book, as long as the alleged crime is significant enough to attract public attention. If this is so, a single bright-line standard that does not distinguish between large and small firms might be preferable. In addition, the bright-line approach would still provide for a factual inquiry into whether fines of $100,000 or less were serious in the particular case, allowing courts to account for the impact of such fines on more modest organizations.
In summary, neither approach to organizational jury rights is flawless. The case-by-case approach has greater support in the case law, but the bright-line
182.
See supra text accompanying notes 142-150 (discussing the development of this six-month rule).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6).
184.
Id. § 3571(c)(5). As with a felony, this penalty can be increased to the maximum provided by the statute setting forth the offense, or to twice the gain or loss caused by the offense. Id.
185.
The defendant always faces a potential fine above $100,000 when charged with a felony or class A misdemeanor. Id. § 3571.
186. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 279.
approach is easier for courts to administer and for businesses to understand, and it provides a more objective and consistent means of gauging the seriousness of a crime. For these reasons, the bright-line approach appears to be the better of the two, even if it has not seen much use in the courts.
iv. booker and the future of the organizational guidelines
This Part considers the full implications of Booker for the organizational guidelines and argues that the guidelines, in their current form, cannot and should not be made mandatory.
A. Can the Organizational Guidelines Be Mandatory After Booker?
Today, Congress and legal commentators are considering a variety of means by which to circumvent Booker and restore mandatory sentencing guidelines. 187 The two primary avenues for achieving such a restoration are judicial and legislative. Neither the courts nor Congress, however, will find an easy fix. Any attempt to make the guidelines mandatory again-consistent with Booker-would be at best highly impractical, and perhaps impossible.
When sentencing organizations, a judge might increase the weight she gives to the organizational guidelines, making them effectively mandatory. After all, judges still must take the guidelines into account when sentencing, 188 and some courts have declared that the sentencing guidelines should carry more weight than other sentencing factors.
189 A judge might suggest that making the guidelines "effectively mandatory" is appropriate because Booker addressed only individual defendants and because Congress sought to make the guidelines binding to the fullest extent that the Constitution permits.
This approach has two potential problems. First, as previously established, both Booker's constitutional holding and its statutory remedy apply to the organizational guidelines. Second, applying the organizational guidelines as if they were mandatory likely violates congressional intent, at least as understood in Booker. Indeed, the Court emphasized that "a mandatory system in some 187. See, e.g., Booker Hearing, supra cases and a nonmandatory system in others" would be inconsistent with congressional intent.
190
Instead, one might argue that restoration of the guidelines to mandatory status could only properly occur by congressional statute. For example, Congress could reenact § 3553(b)(1) but limit its application to the organizational guidelines.
191 This approach, however, would not be constitutional because Booker's reasoning applies to the organizational guidelines with the same force that it applies to the individual guidelines, at least in the vast majority of cases. When sentencing organizations, judges frequently find the facts-such as the loss caused by the crime and the level of involvement of upper-level personnel-that determine both the base fine and culpability score of the defendant, factors that ultimately determine the possible sentences.
192 If the organizational guidelines were mandatory, whenever the organization was entitled to a jury trial, judge-found facts could increase the potential sentence, in violation of the Constitution.
Under either the bright-line or the case-by-case approach, the vast majority of organizations sentenced under the guidelines would be entitled to a jury trial.
Fox Film
193 holds that all organizations facing a potential fine of more than $100,000 are entitled to a jury. Yet every organization sentenced under the guidelines faces a potential fine above $100,000: the guidelines apply only to organizations convicted of a felony or class A misdemeanor, 194 who therefore face a statutory maximum fine of at least $200,000.
195 Thus, under the brightline approach, every organization sentenced under the guidelines has a right to a jury, and mandatory application of the organizational guidelines would violate the organization's Sixth Amendment rights. 191. Congress might also restore the guidelines to mandatory status by altering them so that they would rely solely on facts found by juries (or admitted by the defendant in a plea agreement) rather than on facts found by judges, thereby providing defendants with their full right to a jury trial. The Booker majority, however, rejected such a system for individual defendants as "troubling," id. at 256, and "far more complex than Congress could have intended," id. at 254; see id. at 252-58. (2000); see also supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
196.
Although Fox Film's $100,000 bright line is the only line proposed by a federal court, the bright line could perhaps be drawn at a higher level-say, $1 million. With a $1 million
The case-by-case approach is more amenable to mandatory organizational guidelines than the bright-line approach, but not by much. As discussed in Muniz, Troxler Hosiery, NYNEX, and Yang, this approach requires courts to make some comparison between the size of the potential fine and the organization's assets and ability to pay.
197 Thus, a court may deny a jury trial to an organization facing a significant fine when that fine is not "serious" because the defendant is a large, wealthy organization. 198 In reality, however, very few organizations sentenced under the guidelines have the financial resources of a corporation like NYNEX. The vast majority of sentenced organizations are small, closely held corporations with limited assets 199 and are often unable to pay the fine imposed.
200 Thus, even under the case-by-case approach, Congress could only constitutionally reinstate the guidelines' mandatory status for a small fraction of the organizations sentenced each year. 201 threshold, a significant fraction of defendants (perhaps a majority) would not automatically be entitled to a jury. If these defendants were then denied jury trials, Congress could perhaps reinstate mandatory organizational guidelines for a large fraction of defendants. No one, however, has seriously suggested such a harsh rule, given that it would leave many small firms facing a devastating fine without a right to a jury trial-almost certainly a Sixth Amendment violation. Accordingly, Fox Film proposed evaluating defendants below the bright line on a case-by-case basis, 882 F.2d at 665, a solution that any court using the bright-line rule would be sure to adopt. Setting the bright line high enough would simply cause the bright-line approach to break down into the case-by-case approach. 'G REP. 263 (2005) . Courts are authorized to sentence organizations convicted of a felony up to the greatest of: (1) the maximum fine in the statute setting forth the offense, (2) $500,000, and (3) twice the gain or loss caused by the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)-(d) (2000) . For especially harmful crimes, the fine recommended by the organizational guidelines often exceeds both $500,000 and the maximum in the statute setting forth the offense. See Zane, supra, at 264. Thus, for a court to impose this fine, it must first make the factual finding that the fine is no greater than twice the gain or loss caused by the crime, in violation of the Apprendi rule.
B. Should the Organizational Guidelines Be Mandatory After Booker?
Even if the organizational guidelines could be made mandatory again consistent with Booker's holding, they should not be. First, the organizational guidelines' fine levels possess only the scantest legal, normative, empirical, or historical support. During the drafting process, the Commission used thenstatutory maximums to set a few low and high base fines.
202 It then set the base fines for other offense levels by extrapolation, using what limited historical data it had 203 along with the sentencing patterns for individuals. 204 The Commission decided what factors should be considered in sentencing and what multiplier levels were appropriate using a combination of past data, practical insight, and informed judgment 205 -in other words, enlightened guesswork.
Moreover, recall that the Commission's concerns about its own ability to set appropriate fine levels led it to exclude certain offenses, such as environmental and food and drug crimes, from the guidelines' fine system entirely. 206 The same concerns would suggest that judges should maintain some freedom to depart from the guidelines' fines, especially given the variety and complexity of organizational cases. As an added benefit, allowing judges the flexibility to depart from the guidelines as necessary in particular cases would signal to the Commission which guideline provisions are in need of revision.
207
Three basic arguments are offered for making the organizational guidelines binding-justifications very similar to those for making the individual guidelines mandatory. First, courts are too soft on white-collar and corporate crime, and mandatory guidelines are necessary to increase penalties and ensure 202. For example, the Commission set the lowest base fine (offense level six and below) at $5000 because, absent any aggravating or mitigating factors, this baseline would yield a sentencing range of $5000 to $10,000, and $10,000 is the maximum fine that can be imposed for most class B misdemeanors. SUPP. REPORT, supra note 45, at 13.
203. See id. at 2; see also Cohen, supra note 52, at 253-64 (providing data on monetary sanctions for convicted organizations from 1984-1987, 1988, and 1990 Although organizational penalties have increased drastically since the organizational guidelines were introduced, 209 this increase cannot be exclusively attributed to the guidelines' binding character. Indeed, organizational sentencing levels had been increasing before the guidelines were adopted, 210 and the post-guidelines increase might have been caused by any number of factors, such as more harmful organizational crime, increased prosecution of white-collar crimes, or a greater willingness by judges to impose harsh sentences. Unfortunately, the data are too spotty to allow any strong conclusions, 211 and studies have reached different results. One study of data from 1987 through 1995 found that the guidelines had "no significant effect on the levels or structure of corporate monetary sanctions actually imposed, after controlling for the harm attributed to the offense."
212 In contrast, another study on publicly traded firms sentenced during roughly the same period concluded that, controlling for both crime severity and case type, the guidelines had significantly increased criminal fines.
213
This second study also found, however, that while total sanctions had increased, the guidelines were not responsible for all of the increase. 214 This finding suggested two additional conclusions. First, other factors (for which the study had not controlled) might well have been driving the increase in sanctions: for example, judges might have been cooperating with the movement toward higher sanctions even when the guidelines' fines did not apply. 215 Second, in cases in which guideline fines were mandatory, judges might have responded by decreasing non-fine sanctions. In other words, whenever the guidelines required a higher fine than a judge thought appropriate, he might compensate by reducing the required amount of restitution or other remedies. 216 Thus, the example that the organizational guidelines set, not their binding status, may have driven the increase.
Second, there is no indication that mandatory guidelines reduce organizational sentencing disparity. A recent study relying on data from 1991 to 2001 found a good deal of unexplained variance in organizational sentences, leading the authors to conclude that significant disparity haunted organizational sentencing even under the mandatory guidelines. 217 The authors were not able to determine whether the sentencing disparity was less than before the organizational guidelines were created-that is, whether the guidelines were of any use in decreasing disparity. Moreover, the apparent similarity between guideline and non-guideline organizational sentences 218 suggests that if there is disparity in organizational sentencing, mandatory guidelines do little to correct it. As noted, the total sanctions judges impose on convicted organizations are roughly in accordance with the organizational guidelines even when the guidelines' fine levels do not apply. 219 Thus, judges appear to reach roughly the same sentences regardless of whether the organizational guidelines are mandatory or advisory: if the guidelines do reduce disparity in sentencing, they need not be mandatory to accomplish this reduction.
Finally, mandatory organizational guidelines are not needed to induce organizations to create compliance programs. Since the organizational guidelines' creation, only three organizations have had their sentences reduced for compliance, 220 perhaps because the Department of Justice restricts prosecution largely to organizations without effective compliance programs. Corporate directors, therefore, adopt compliance programs primarily to prevent the government from prosecuting the corporation 222 and to prevent themselves from becoming civilly liable to their shareholders. 223 These incentives to maintain compliance programs do not evaporate with the shift to advisory guidelines.
Thus, the complexity of organizational crime and the artificiality of the organizational guidelines' fine levels counsel strongly in favor of allowing judges some flexibility in setting fines, and no convincing rationale exists for denying them such flexibility. Indeed, some evidence suggests that when judges are denied flexibility in setting organizational fines, they simply compensate by adjusting the non-fine sanctions, such as the amount of restitution required. 224 Congress, the Commission, and the courts should not go searching for ways to make the organizational guidelines mandatory again; they are best left advisory.
conclusion
Booker severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), the provision that made all of the sentencing guidelines mandatory. Its holding clearly applies to the organizational guidelines and therefore rendered them nonmandatory as well. After Booker, Congress, lower federal courts, and the Sentencing Commission cannot make the organizational guidelines, as currently drafted, mandatory again. The vast majority of organizations sentenced under the guidelines are small. The potential fines they face are large and, hence, serious. Most, if not all, of these organizations are entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and Booker prohibits courts from sentencing them using mandatory guidelines together with judge-found facts.
Yet even if some sentenced organizations do not have a jury right, Congress and the courts should keep the organizational guidelines advisory. Organizational sentencing is complex and calls for judicial flexibility. The purposes of organizational sentencing are best served if judges can depart from the guidelines' recommendations when those recommendations would be inappropriate in the particular case. Booker provides courts with this pragmatic flexibility, and neither Congress nor the courts should eliminate it.
